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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT 
REGARDING VOIR DIRE OF GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The trial court refused t|o ask the following voir 
dire questions: 
Question 1: 
Question 2: 
Question 3: 
Question 5: 
Question 6: 
How long have you lived in 
Washington County? 
If you have lived here 
less than JO years, where 
did you come from? 
What is your age? 
What is the highest level 
of [your] education? 
What degrees have you 
received? 
Jane Doe's brief relies on the landmark Utah case 
of State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utdh 1984) as well as three 
recent federal cases which are sqparely in point. (See 
Appellant's Brief, at p.2 & 3,) 
Reeves' brief virtually 
issue. First, Reeves says that the 
the jurors ages by looking at them. 
p.10.) That is perhaps so; but Reeves offers no authority 
ignores this important 
attorneys could guess at 
(Brief of Respondent, at 
1 
for the proposition that guesswork is an excuse for voir 
dire* 
With respect to questions 1, 2, 5 and 6 above, 
Reeves' only comment is as follows: 
The requested voir dire ques-
tions . . • were properly denied by the 
court as not being probative of matters 
that would shed light on the bias, 
prejudice, or impartiality of the 
jurors . . . 
Brief of Respondent, at p. 9 and 10. Reeves has offered no 
argument, no analysis, and no authority to support the trial 
court's ruling. Indeed, Reeve's suggestion that the voir 
dire must be "probative" is directly contradicted by State v. 
Ball, Id. at p. 1058-59. State v. Ball teaches that one 
purpose of voir dire is to permit counsel to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges. Suppose, for example, that 
counsel does not like Greek jurors. Counsel may ask whether 
members of the jury panel were born in Greece. Of course, 
that question is not relevant to anything. Nevertheless, 
counsel may ask irrelevant questions in order to get rid of 
Greek jurors. Thus, questions that relate solely to 
peremptory challenges are by their very nature irrelevant. 
Voir dire is not a trivial issue. Failure to ask 
simple questions, such as educational background, deprives a 
litigant of an important historical right. (See Art Press 
2 
Ltd. v. Western Printing Machinery 
1986.) (Copy attached as Exhibit A 
POINT II 
791 F.2d 616 (7th Cir, 
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT 
REGARDING ISSUES OF ALCQHOL, TOBACCO 
AND PRE-MARITAL SEX 
During the trial, Reejves offered verbal or 
documentary evidence that Jane Doe: 
1. Smokes; 
2. Drinks alcohol; 
3. Had an abortion or miscarriage; 
4. Submitted to a voluntary sterilization; 
5. Engaged in pre-maritaJL sex; 
6. Used marijuana. 
Only item No. 6 (marijuani) was excluded. All of 
the other items were received into evidence 
Jane Doe's brief argued tljiat all of the foregoing 
items were irrelevant and amounted 
assassination. (Brief of Appellant, 
Reeves' brief argues that 
|to intentional character 
at pp.12-19.) 
the evidence on smoking, 
alcohol and pre-marital sex was ail harmless because the 
evidence was only in documents (viz 
were received into evidence) while nothing was said verbally 
hospital records which 
(See Brief of Respondent, at p.24,25.) That argument is 
frivolous because it assumes that the jury never looks at 
exhibits- Defense counsel must have believed that the jury 
would look at the exhibits or he wouldn't have offered them. 
Reeves has offered no authority for this novel argument. 
After Jane Doe's opening brief was filed, this 
court decided the case of Belden v. Dalbo, 80 Utah Adv.Rpto 
20 (April 14, 1988). Belden involved an auto accident. At 
the time of the accident, the plaintiff was allegedly 
involved in an extra-marital affair. The defense attorney 
asked a series of questions which focused on the extra-
marital relationship. This court stated: 
Dalbo and Peel's attorney argued that 
Lingwall's extra-marital affair with 
Belden may have had some relevance to 
his state of mind at the time of the 
accident. However, the evidence 
conceivably could have affected the 
juries opinion of Lingwall, provoked its 
instinct to punish and improperly entered 
into the juries deliberations. In 
weighing the probative value of the 
evidence versus its prejudicial effect, 
we find that the danger of unfair 
prejudice is significantly greater than 
the relevance of the evidence. . .We 
hold, therefore, that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the 
evidence of Lingwall's purported extra-
marital affair with Belden. 
80 Utah Adv.Rpt. at p. 23. 
4 
In Belden, the court found that the error was not 
prejudicial. According to Belden, phe test for prejudice is 
whether ". . .there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached absent the tainted 
evidence," 80 Utah Adv.Rpt. at p. 23. Jane Doe respectfully 
submits that Belden misstates the test. (See cases collected 
at Brief of Appellant, p. 46 and 47.) Nevertheless, in the 
case at bar, there was "a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached absent the tainted 
evidence." (See Brief of Appellant, 
Doe was prejudiced under any test 
POINT III 
, at p. 49.) Thus, Jane 
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH 
ARGUMENT REGARDING THE 
AND VOLUNTARY STERI 
MISCARRIAGE 
JZATION 
(Rule 402 U.R.E.) and 
Over Jane Doe's vigorous objection, the court 
received evidence on miscarriage and voluntary sterilization 
(or spontaneous abortion). Jane Doe's brief challenged the 
testimony on grounds of relevance | 
prejudice (Rule 403 U.R.E.). J&ne Doe's argument was 
supported by ten significant citations of authority. (See 
Brief of Appellant at pp.26-30.) 
argument was that: 
The core of Jane Doe's 
[MJatters concerning the etiology of a 
medical condition may generally only be 
proved by expert testimony. 
Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mtn., Inc., 584 P.2d 432, 441 (Wash. 
App. 1984) . 
In response, Reeves cites two cases: Thompson v. 
LeGrande Johnson Construction Co., 688 P.2d 489 (Utah 1984); 
and Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). However, 
those cases are not in point. The issue in Dixon v. Stewart, 
supra, was whether or not an expert may testify. In other 
words, was the expert testimony admissible. The issue in the 
case at bar is whether an expert must testify to establish a 
causal relationship. Thompson v. LeGrande, supra., is 
actually the opposite of the case at bar. Thompson holds 
that a jury is not required to believe expert testimony. 
However, Thompson certainly does not hold that a causal 
relationship can be established without expert testimony. 
In this case, Jane Doe suffered from depression. 
Jane Doe's theory at trial was that the depression (or brain 
injury) was caused by the car accident. On the other hand, 
defendant's theory was that the depression was caused by the 
miscarriage/sterilization. Thus, the precise legal issue is 
whether expert testimony is required to establish the cause 
(or etiology) of mental depression; or can a jury decide the 
cause of depression based on lay testimony. 
6 
Indeed, defendant's expert has testified that the 
cause of depression is a complex medical issue: 
Q. [To the defense expert] What things 
can cause depression^ 
A. Oh, there are a host of things. 
depression organic brain damage can 
precipitate a depress) 
causes. 
• * * 
person's life; 
uture; various 
tability of the 
which may not 
in damage, but 
Complications in a 
threats to their fh 
kinds of changes in s|i 
biochemical system, 
necessarily mean brcij 
it may mean biochemical changes. 
Death of a loved one; grief of any 
sort; grieving the loss of a 
grieving the loss of 
Virtually anything 
grieve over can 
job; 
a loved one. 
that one can 
brecipitate a 
ion. A host of 
(April 9 Tr. at p. 265.) Reeves has offered no authority 
that a jury can decide such a complex medical issue (etiology 
of depression) without expert testimony! For example, in the 
absence of expert testimony, how could the jury know if Jane 
Doe's depression was from miscarriage or a change in brain 
chemistry? 
Reeves' remaining argument) 
the record. Reeves' brief states: 
Dr. Weight f u r t h e r 
t h a t i f he had been 
t h e m i s c a r r i a g e 
sterilization, he would have 
gone into those mat 
deeply to determine whether or 
is a characterization of 
testified 
aware of 
or the 
ters very 
7 
not those two factors were the 
cause of her depression. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p.27.) 
The actual testimony was a bit different: 
Q. Had you been aware of the steriliza-
tion at the time that you were in-
terviewing and testing her, would— 
what would it have done, if any-
thing, to have changed the way 
you did all of your tests or 
the way that you discussed it 
with her? 
A. Well, I would specifically want to 
know about it. I would want to know 
anything that might contribute to 
the depression . . . 
Q. And would sterilization be one of 
the potentially real serious causes 
of depression? 
A. It could be. It would be something 
I would want her opinion on. I 
would want to know, you know, 
whether that's something she was 
having a hard time living with, a 
decision like that. 
(April 9 Tr. at p. 265-268.) (Emphasis added.) 
In short, the defense expert was given every 
opportunity to connect the depression with the miscar-
riage/sterilization. He was not able to form an opinion. At 
most, he could only say: "It could be." Or in other words, 
the defense expert was merely speculating. Without expert 
testimony, the jury was also permitted to speculate. 
8 
Finally, Reeves argued that Jane Doe failed to 
reveal the miscarriage/sterilization during the independent 
medical examination. (Brief of Respondent, at p.27.) 
However, that is not because Jane 
anything. Rather, no one bothered to ask her1: 
[To defense experjt by defense 
that you would 
talk about with 
counsel] Is it one 
have expected her to 
you [the decisioh to have 
sterilization], now 
aware of it? 
since she 
Doe was trying to hide 
that you are 
A. Only 
asked if there were 
they had delayed theilr 
I had no idea tha|t 
choice, so I 
that it would have 
come up other than my pursuing, 
know, "What's troubling you?" 
(April 9 Tr. at p. 268-69.) 
commented when I 
children, that 
family and so 
that was a 
would!-I don't know 
spontaneously 
you 
*It seems that the flaw is nt>t 
trying to hide something; rather, 
failed to prepare his own expert to 
After all, defense counsel had a 
hospital records including the steri 
(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 31-32.) Presumably, defense 
counsel could have given those records to his own expert in 
preparation for the independent medical 
Jane Doe has no duty to unilaterally 
medical records in to the independent medical exam. That is 
because Jane Doe was 
the defendant attorney 
delve into those areas. 
11 of Jane Doe's prior 
ization and miscarriage. 
especially so where Jane Doe doesn 
records as being relevant. In 
counsel's fault that his own expert} 
miscarriage/sterilization. 
exam, 
haul all 
Certainly, 
of her old 
even regard those prior 
summary, it is defense 
did not know about the 
9 
Jane Doe's expert did not regard the issue to be 
of any significance. 
Q. , [To plaintiff's expert by defense 
counsel]--and from Dr. Weight's 
report, was it ever divulged to you 
by [Jane Doe] or any other sources 
that on March 3 of 1980 that she 
had a miscarriage? 
A. Nof she did not, and it wouldn't 
have been significant to me. 
4e * "k ie 
Q. You didn't think that if she had 
anxiety about having a family, that 
it would be of any problem for her? 
A. Not if she didn't identify it and 
not after six years. That's a long 
time. 
(April 9 Tr., at p. 158-159.) 
Finally, there is simply no evidence that questions 
on miscarriage or sterilization are part of a standard 
psychological exam. Thus, there was nothing sinister about 
Jane Doe failing to reveal the miscarriage/sterilization to 
the doctors. Indeed, neither doctor regarded the subject as 
significant enough to even ask the question.^ 
^The defense expert apparently conducted his standard 
interview. (April 9 Tr. at p. 221-222.) There is absolutely 
no evidence that Jane Doe lied in her interview. Rather, the 
doctor didn't ask the question. 
10 
POINT IV 
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FiVlTH ARGUMENT 
REGARDING THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY 
Jane Doe argued that the testimony regarding 
miscarriage/sterilization was introduced as a surprise at 
trial. (Brief of Appellant, at p.|20.) Jane Doe's opening 
brief argued that the miscarriage/stlerilization testimony was 
not revealed in answers to interrogatories. Jane Doe' s 
opening brief further argued that tne miscarriage/steriliza-
tion testimony was not revealed in| 
order. (Brief of Appellant,at p. 
Reeves is silent. Apparently, Reevels concedes both points! 
Reeves sole response to thp issue of surprise issue 
was that: 
Thus, at least one year 
plaintiff's counsel was 
examining 
plaintiff. 
to miscarriage and 
sterilization came as 
plaintiff's counsel, it 
the extensive pre-trial 
22.) On these issues, 
|>rior to trial, 
obtaining and 
all medical rbcords on the 
If the information pertaining 
tihe voluntary 
surprise to 
s only because 
tnedical records 
long before 
of his failure to examine 
to which he had acces$ 
defendant counsel did. 
In addition to that, 
surprise" testimony pert 
miscarriage/sterilization 
within the knowledge and 
the plaintiff herself. I 
inform her counsel of f 
the issues in this case, . 
in counsel to try to shift 
ac 
the so-called 
aining to the 
was information 
understanding of 
she failed to 
ts germane to 
t does not lie 
responsibility 
11 
away from plaintiff and attempt to place 
it on defense counsel. There was no 
surprise that could not readily have been 
examined, and for which plaintiff's 
counsel had access long before defense 
counsel. 
Brief of Respondent, at p. 32. 
Reeves has offered no authority for this novel 
argument• 
Jane Doe concedes that she and her counsel were 
both aware of the history of the miscarriage/sterilization. 
However, Jane Doe was not aware of the defense theory that 
the miscarriage/sterilization caused the depression (rather 
than the car accident causing the depression). 
An example may be helpful. Suppose that Jane Doe 
had eggs and bacon for breakfast. Suppose, at trial, Reeves 
suddenly offered evidence that Jane Doe had eaten eggs and 
bacon. Jane Doe might first object on the grounds of 
relevance. However, Reeves might respond that eggs and bacon 
are relevant on the theory that Jane Doe's brain damage was 
caused by an allergic reaction to the eggs and bacon. Next, 
Jane Doe might object on the grounds of surprise because the 
eggs and bacon theory had not been revealed in pretrial 
discovery. Suppose Reeves then argues (as here) that there 
can be no surprise because Jane Doe obviously knows what she 
had for breakfast. The argument is absurd. Of course, Jane 
12 
Doe knows what she had for breakfast, but she would have no 
way of knowing that her breakfast menu would be injected into 
the trial. Nor, could Jane Doe have any way of knowing the 
defense theory that bacon and eggs caused the brain damage. 
This was not a minor technical error. This was an 
egregious error. The issue goes f ar beyond mere surprise. 
Here there was a detailed, formal pre-trial order. There was 
no good faith basis for a violation 
POINT V 
REEVES' BRIEF HAS TOTALLY IGNORED 
of that pre-trial order. 
THREE CRUCIAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
A crucial point in the trial was the admission of 
hospital records regarding miscarriage and sterilization. 
Jane Doe challenged those documents on multiple grounds. 
(See Brief of Appellant, at p. 20-34.) Reeves' brief 
responded to some—but not all of the issues. Specifically, 
Reeves failed to even respond to the following issues: 
1. Jane Doe claims that the trial court careless-
ly admitted exhibits into evidence because " . . . they [the 
jury] don't read them anyway." (S^e Brief of Appellant at 
p. 33.) Jane Doe contends that act | was an abuse of discre-
tion. 
13 
2. Jane Doe claims that receiving the voluminous 
hospital records violated Rule 403 U.R.E. (confusion). (See 
Brief of Appellant, at p.30.) 
3. Jane Doe claims that some portions of the 
hospital records violated Rule 805 U.R.E. (hearsay within 
hearsay). (See Brief of Appellant, at p.31-32.) 
It is clear from the record that the trial judge 
refused to even consider these objections. (See Brief of 
Appellant, at pp.28-34.) 
These are crucial issues based squarely on the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and respectable authority. The issues 
deserve more than mere silence! 
POINT VI 
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT 
ON THE LAY TESTIMONY ISSUE 
Jane Doe's brief argued that the trial court 
erroneously excluded the lay opinion evidence of Dennis 
Parker. (Brief of Appellant, at pp.35-40.) Reeves' brief 
responded that no proper foundation was laid. Specifically, 
Reeves says: 
14 
No issue was ever raisled that (sic) 
opinion was to be given by a lay witness, 
as permitted by Rule 701J It never got 
to that point, because the witness did 
give conclusionary opinions without the 
necessary laying of the foundation. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 44.)(Emphasis added.) 
Reeves has simply misread 
that there were some preliminary skirmishes on foundational 
questions. However, the foundat 
crossed. The ultimate question was 
Q. Based on what you 
please answer the question based on 
what you observed. 
A. What I observed is that they have— 
pe with their 
now, I mean, 
they were very clo 
family and they are 
they stay at home. 
the record. It is true 
lional hurdles had been 
bs follows: 
have observed, 
MR. JEFFS: Objection, he's giving a conclusion 
THE COURT: The objection is sust 
(April 9 Tr. at p. 33.) (Emphasis 
Thus, the specific object 
that the witness was giving a cone 
That specific issue was briefed by 
Reeves. 
ined. 
addled. ) 
jLon before the court was 
usion (or lay opinion) . 
Jane Doe and ignored by 
15 
POINT VII 
THEY JURY CAN BE MISLED BY PLAY-ACTING 
Jane Doe argued that the jury was misled by 
permitting a frail widow (and non-party) to sit at counsel 
table. (Brief of Appellant, at pp.7-12.) 
Reeves responded thatt 
Nowhere in the oral argument nor in any 
presentation was there any reference 
whatsoever to Florence Reeves except for 
the utilization of her help in the 
selection of jurors during voir 
dire . . . 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 22.) 
Reeves' argument seems to be that play-acting is 
okay as long as no words are used on the record. However, 
everyone knows that a lawyer can send messages to the jury 
without using words. See e.g. Brons v. Bischoff, 277 N.W.2d 
854 (Wis. 1979). (Plaintiff claimed she could not sit at 
counsel table because of pain; however, the court refused 
permission to let plaintiff stand in the courtroom because 
the jury would be misled.) 
Reeves claims that the widow was only permitted to 
sit at counsel table for the sole purpose of assisting with 
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voir dire.J However, the jury was not told of that limited 
purpose! All the jury knew is that the frail widow was at 
counsel table for part of the trial, and then that she got 
sick and went home. 
Reeves has cited absolutely no authority which 
would permit a non-party to sit at counsel table. For an 
additional case which precluded a widow from sitting at 
counsel table, see Livingston v. Bias, 640 P.2d 362 (Kan. 
1982) . 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO VOIR DIRE 
CONCERNING JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL 
INJURY CASES ALLOWED JURORS TO SIT WITHOUT 
DETERMINING BIAS OR PARTIALITY 
1 • There Was No Voir Dire to Bring Out Any Connection 
Jurors May Have Had With Insurance Companies. 
Jane Doe tried to ask the jury panel whetherf 
.any of you own stock in any liability insurance 
company?" It is "the almost universal view that . . . a 
plaintiff may, in good faith, interrogate the jury on voir 
JJane Doe does not concede that the widow "assisted" 
voir dire in any way. Rather she sat silently as a "prop." 
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Balle v. Smith, 
dire as to their, or their relatives', possible connection 
with, or interesjt in, liability insurance companies . 
95 A.L.R. 404, I Annot. "Informing Jury of Liability In-
surance. " 
The question proposed by Jane Doe complied with 
81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932). Reeves 
tries to distinguish Balle because that case involved a local 
company. But the possibility of a juror's financial stake in 
a case is not limited to local companies as Reeves suggests. 
A juror with stopk in a major national firm (e.g. Allstate) 
has the same financial risk as a juror with stock in a local 
insurance company. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "counsel for 
plaintiff is entitled to learn of any juror's interest in or 
connection with any insurance or casualty company 
opinion, Kilpack 
Barney, 20 Ut.2d 
19 Ut.2d 261, 429 
Kilpack v. Wiqnall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 fn.2 (1979). (Emphasis 
added.) If Kilpack is inconsistent with Tjas v. Proctor, 591 
P.2d 438 (Utah 1979), this court must follow the more recent 
Other cases cited by Reeves, Young v. 
108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); Ellis v. Gilbert, 
P.2d 39 (1967) and Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 
P. 2d 121 (1961) all deal with admitting Ut.2d 261, 409 
insurance as evidence. On the other hand, the case at Bar 
deals with the 4ntr°duction of insurance during voir dire, 
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Furthermore, those cases are superseded by Rule 411, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
The recent case of King v. Fereday, 739 P. 2d 618 
(Utah 1987) held that the court might ask if jurors owned 
stock in a business instead of asking if jurors owned stock 
in an insurance company. However, in this case, the lower 
court failed to ask either question. 
2. There Was No Voir Dire Sufficient to Uncover Bias 
Related to Tort Reform Publicity. 
Jane Doe submitted evidence of a recent advertising 
campaign (by insurance companies) designed to scare the 
public about jury awards. Jane Doe should have been allowed 
to use voir dire to determine juror attitudes to this 
advertising campaign. State v. Nichols, 734 P. 2d 170 (Mont. 
1987) at 173: 
Voir dire must be used to determine which 
jurors have been so affected by pretrial 
publicity, [that] they would be unable to 
render a fair verdict. 
U.S. v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) at 1497: 
Where there is the possibility or 
likelihood that potential jurors have 
been exposed to prejudicial publicity, 
they must be questioned with special care 
so as to insure that such publicity did 
not result in bias. 
State v. Greenawalt, 624 P.2d 828 (Ariz. 1981) at 841: 
An examination of the jurors, through 
voir dire process, is an effective means 
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by which to determine the effects or 
influence of pretrial publicity on the 
jurors. 
Without an effective voir dire regarding the 
insurance industry's media blitz, there was no way to 
determine whethep jurors should have been excused for cause; 
able to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges on that issue- Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P. 2d 688 
(Mont 1979); Kind v. Westlake 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978). 
nor was counsel 
Reeves | asserts that "questions 23, 24, 39 and 40 
were calculated to circumvent the prohibitions of Rule 411 of 
the Rules of Evidence.^ (Brief of Respondent, at p.10.) 
Howeverf the opposite is true. Rule 411 allows evidence of 
insurance, inter alia, to show "bias or prejudice of a 
witness." If insurance is admissible to test the bias of a 
witness, it should be admissible to test the bias of a juror. 
Furthermore, the voir dire questions only probed 
juror bias toward insurance generally, and made no implica-
tion that Reeves was in fact insured. 
was or was not 
upon the issue 
wrongfully. Thj 
evidence of ins 
Rule 411. liiability Insurance: "Evidence that a person 
insured against liability is not admissible 
whether he acted negligently or otherwise 
s rule does not require the exclusion of 
urance against liability when offered for 
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or 
control, or bigs or prejudice of a witness." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Reeves further claims that "Jane Doe" failed to lay 
a proper Borkoski foundation because no juror had said there 
was anything in their background that would affect their 
ability to be impartial. Reeves misleads the court by 
leaving out the alternative Borkoski foundation: a showing 
that a juror has read magazines or periodicals which have 
contained insurance propaganda. Borkoski v. Yost, supra, 
at 695. In order to lay this foundation, Jane Doe tried to 
ask which magazines jurors subscribed to (Question 6). 
However, Reeves objected. The objection was sustained. 
Having prevented Jane Doe from laying the foundation, Reeves 
cannot now complain about the lack of foundation. 
POINT IX 
JANE DOE WAS IMPROPERLY REQUIRED TO PROVE 
FUTURE DAMAGE TO A REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
1. The Adequacy of Plaintiff's Objection to the Instruc-
tions 21 and 23. 
Instructions 21 and 23 limited Jane Doe's recovery 
to future damages that were reasonably certain to occur. 
Plaintiff objected as follows, 
Instruction 21 refers to reasonable 
certainty, "reasonably certain to suffer 
in the future." And in fact it should 
read "reasonably probable to suffer in 
the future." 
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(April 10 Tr., p. 112-113.) 
As to Instruction 2 3 , again it speaks in 
terms of "reasonable medical certainty" 
instead of "reasonable medical probabi-
lity-
Objections 
[plaintiff] obj 
must "state distinctly the matter to which 
bets, and the ground for [her] objection." 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Jane Doe's objection 
stated distinctly the matter objected to, i.e. the word 
"certain." The 
word is "probab 
t 
ground was also stated, i.e. that the proper 
e." A lengthy argument was not necessary.^ 
Reeves complain^ that "No citation was given to Court[sic] 
upon which it could predicate any evaluation of the claimed 
^A lengthy argument had, in fact, occurred in chambers 
The court has been reviewing with counsel 
the instructions to be given to the jury 
as well as the special verdict form. The 
court has advised them that they may now 
make their exceptions and objections to 
the Court's instructions. 
* * * * 
MR. DE^RY: Your Honor, may I add for the 
record] if the Court please, that in 
addition to that, the Court has, for well 
over an hour, consulted with counsel in 
some detail on each jury instruction, so 
that the record--the Court has heard 
comments from counsel on the--
THE COURT: Yes, I have. 
MR. DEBRY: —on the instructions. 
22 
objection." (Brief of Respondent, p.49.) But the fact that 
counsel did not have controlling Utah authority at his 
fingertips does not affect the adequacy of the objection: 
We know of no ruling that requires a 
lawyer to cite specific cases on 
objection to evidence admitted at trial 
so long as the grounds relied upon are a 
correct interpretation of the law. 
Indeed, in many instances, the 
objections arise in unforeseen 
situations, and to adopt the requirement 
that appellees suggest would be to put 
upon a trial lawyer an unduly burdensome 
duty. 
First Nat. Bank v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 237 N.E.2d 
108, 111 (Ind. 1968). Few trials are recessed, so that 
counsel can search for controlling precedents to support an 
objection. 
The objection "was sufficient to bring to the trial 
court's attention the principle relied on . . . " Fromen v. 
Perrin, 213 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Iowa 1973) (objection to four 
specific words in instruction with statement of correct 
language sufficient to preserve error). Compare Jane Doe's 
objection with Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 547 
(Utah 1984) (objection that instruction was "not a correct 
statement of the law" and which referred to wrong paragraph 
was insufficient). Jane Doe's objection was distinct, 
specific and accurate. Taken in conjunction with a lengthy 
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(well over one 
adequately advid 
ijour) conference off the record, the judge was 
ed of Jane Doe's position. 
2. Jane Doe was Held to an Improperly Strict Burden of 
Proof. 
A plaintiff such as Jane Doe may recover for 
damages probably caused by the accident. Moore v. D.R.G.W. 
Ry. Co. , 4 Ut.2ti 255; 292 P.2d 849 (1956); Kirchgastner v, 
D. R . G. W. Ry. Co 
Apex Mining Co., 
was recently rea 
, 218 P.2d 685 (Utah 1950); Picino v. Utah-
52 Utah 338; 173 P. 900 (1918). This rule 
tfirmed by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The evidence must do more than merely 
give rise to speculation that damages in 
fact occurred; it must give rise to a 
reasonable probability that the plaintiff 
suffered damage ] ". . 
Atkin, Wright & Miller v. Mtn. States Telegraph and Telephone 
Co. , 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). This is in accord with 
the general rulq 
preponderance of 
The dif 
not idle semantic 
that a plaintiff must prove her case by a 
the evidence. 
ference between probability and certainty is 
s (as defendant suggests). Instructions are 
given meaning in accordance with the ordinary and usual 
import of the language as it would be understood by lay 
jurors." Biswelll v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80f88 (Utah 1987). 
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"Certain" means "free from doubt." Black's Law 
Diet., 3d Ed., p.204. "Probable" means: "having more 
evidence for than against, supported by evidence which 
inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room for 
doubt." Ici. at p. 1081. (Emphasis added.) 
In Whatcott v. Continental Cas. Co., 85 Utah 406; 
39 P. 2d 733, 735 (Utah 1935) the Utah Supreme Court found 
reversible error in an instruction that said "if you are in 
doubt . . . your verdict should be for the defendant." The 
reason was that: 
Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict at 
the hands of the jury if, to their minds, 
she established the material allegations 
of her complaint by a preponderance or 
greater weight of the evidence. 
Obviously there may be a clear 
preponderance of the evidence in favor of 
the existence of an alleged fact and yet 
the jury may entertain some doubt about 
it being the fact. 
Accord, Miller v. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1962): 
To require proof to a reasonable degree 
of certainty is to require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is a higher 
burden of proof than that required in 
civil actions. 
In summary, the difference between "probability" 
and "certainty" is the difference between proof by 
preponderance of the evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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The only applicable case cited by defendant is over 
twenty-five years old, Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Ut.2d 261, 
409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1961) .6 Robinson uncritically followed a 
standard jury instruction that itself failed to follow prior 
Utah precedent. | This court should not make that same error, 
but should folllow the rule affirmed in the recent case of 
Atkin, Wright & 
Utah authority, 
3. Instructing! 
Miller, supra, and followed by the weight of 
the Jury to Apply the Wrong Burden of Proof 
Was Prejudicial Error 
The burden of proof is a crucial issue. Cases are 
won and lost by the jury's application of the burden of 
proof. Error in instructing the jury on the appropriate 
burden of proof is reversible error. Whatcott v. Continental 
Cas. Co. , supra J 39 P«2d at 735. Accord, Miller v. Watkins, 
supra, 355 S.W.id at 3; Parker v. Williams, 268 So.2d 746, 
750 (Ala. 1972); 
App. 1967); Boltk v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 716 (N.J. 1958) 
Colbert v. Borland, 306 P.2d 53, 58 (Cal 
Furtheifmore, Jane Doe's evidence was consistently 
phrased in terms |of "probability," not "certainty." (April 9 
Tr. at pp. 62, 66 and 93.) The jury may well have concluded 
that Jane Doe failed to meet her burden of proof because the 
^Alverado v Tuckett, 2 Ut.2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954) 
merely affirms tfhe preponderance of the evidence standard 
urged by Jane Doe). 
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testimony did not rise to a level of certainty, as opposed to 
probability. 
POINT X 
THE ISSUE OF 
DR. CAPEL'S TESTIMONY IS MOOT 
Jane Doe asked her treating orthopedic doctor 
(Dr.Capel) whether her injuries would make her barbering 
"more difficult or impossible-" Reeves objected that the 
question was "leading and suggestive." The objection was 
sustained. Jane Doe argued that the trial court erred by 
sustaining the objection. Brief of Appellant, at p. 44. 
Reeves' response was that the answer received was in evidence 
before the court sustained the objection. Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 51. Although that is a curious position, 
Jane Doe will accept the concession. This issue is, 
therefore, moot. 
POINT XI 
THE COST OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SURGERY WAS RELEVANT 
TO ASSESSING THE FUTURE MEDICAL RISKS TO JANE DOE 
Jane Doe's treating orthopedic doctor testified 
that she faces a risk of traumatic arthritis in her shoulder 
as a result of the accident. (April 8 Tr. p. 93.) Reeves 
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properly brought 
388; 472 P.2d 9 
apparently concedes that the risk of future arthritis was 
before the jury. Brown v. Johnson, 24 Ut.2d 
142 (1970). ^  Reeves' objection goes only to 
Dr. Capel's estimate of future costs of possible surgery. 
Jane Doe does not argue that the cost of surgery 
would be recoverable, in full, as an item of special damages. 
Reeves concedes that to recover the full cost of future 
surgery, Jane Doe must show that future surgery was "more 
probable than not." (Brief of Respondent, p.48). (See 
generally, Appellant's Brief at Point IX, p.43-44—proof that 
future damages are probablec) 
However, the amount of expense associated with the 
50 percent (or less) chance of surgery is relevant to assist 
the jury in awarding general damages for the risk of future 
disability. 
Reeves makes a blurry factual argument that Dr. 
Capel said the future surgery was only "possible." Reeves 
picks these words out of context to apparently suggest that 
the risk of future surgery was too remote or speculative. 
However, Dr. Capel's exact testimony was that: 
7Reeves doe? 
precedent. 
not cite or discuss this controlling Utah 
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It [future surgery] is only possible, and 
I wouldn't say that it was any more 
possible than 50 percent. 
The fact that Dr. Capel uses guarded medical 
terminology does not mean that the jury is unable to evaluate 
the evidence. The jury was entitled to evaluate that risk 
whether it was 1 percent or 99 percent. Without medical 
testimony, the jury was unable to properly evaluate and 
award general damages for that risk. 
Reeves argues that the future harm (surgery) "must 
be more probable than not . . . ". (Brief of Respondent, 
p. 48.) However, Reeves' legal argument was rejected by Brown 
v. Johnson, supra: 
This does not mean that the chances of 
sustaining the harm must be over 50 
percent. It means that the jury must be 
convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there is a definite risk of 
harm, and when so convinced, the jury 
will evaluate that risk. 24 Ut.2d at 
392. 
POINT XII 
THE CAUSE SHOULD BE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 
TO ALLOW PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON SPECIAL DAMAGES 
Jane Doe sought prejudgment interest on her special 
damages. (Brief of Appellant, at p. 50.) Reeves states "the 
trial court did not fail to provide for prejudgment 
interest." (Brief of Respondent, at 57.) While the judgment 
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seems ambiguous, Jane Doe accepts Reeves' concession. 
Therefore, this [court's opinion should confirm that Jane Doe 
is entitled to prejudgment interest on her special damages, 
pursuant to the Concession of Reeves, 
POINT XIII 
JANE DOE SHOULD BE ENTITLED 
TO COSlTS AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE APPEAL 
to Jane Doe's 
Some of the issues in this case are genuinely-
contested. It is reasonable to have a vigorous debate over 
such bona fide issues. 
However, other issues are not seriously contested. 
The following issues merit sanctions: 
1. Reeves has made no response of any substance 
claims regarding voir dire of general 
background. (Suj^ ra, at Point I.) 
2. Reeves' excuse for introducing evidence on 
smoking, drinking, and premarital sex is frivolous. (Supra, 
To the extent that this was an intentional 
character assassination, counsel should personally be 
sanctioned. 
3. Reeves has offered no good faith argument for 
introducing surprise medical records in violation of the 
at Point II.) 
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formal pretrial order and contrary to the pretrial discovery. 
(Supra, at Point IV.) 
4. Reeves has totally ignored three important 
evidentiary issues. (Supra., at Point V.) 
5. Reeves has ignored, or misstated, the record 
with respect to lay testimony. (Supra., at Point VI.) 
6. Placing a non-party, sick, old widow and her 
oxygen tank at counsel table was (at a minimum) "fishy." 
(Supra., at Point VII.) 
The real issues (Points III, VIII, IX, and XI 
above) should be hard fought. However, enormous time has 
been wasted on the frivolous issues. Costs and attorney fees 
are appropriate. (Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals.) 
Respectfully submitted this /o day of 
-TY\L 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: / \-C~iS 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
r 
1DAtflEL F. BERTCH 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Jane Doe v. Hafen, 
et al.) was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this __/£jjh 
day of A^flUV, / 1988, to the following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
/ek 
tftun^J^'1 
32 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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t5,61 In any event, even assuming ar-
guendo that the Walker rule is correct, we 
find that the district court erred in deciding 
Ferguson's motion to dismiss for want of 
personal jurisdiction before determining 
whether there was complete diversity. We 
note first that the district court stated in 
its order that the subject-matter jurisdic-
tion question was as easy to resolve as the 
in personam jurisdiction question. Thus, 
according to the trial court's own assess-
ment, neither motion was more "conve-
nient" in terms of difficulty. Second, fed-
eralism concerns tip the scales in favor of 
initially ruling on the motion to remand. 
In passing on Ferguson's motion, the dis-
trict court was required to delve into diffi-
cult questions of Illinois law concerning the 
fraudulent-enticement doctrine and the 
scope of that state's long-arm statute.8 It 
should not have considered these issues 
when it was presented with a federal ques-
tion of at least equal, if not less, difficulty 
relating to complete diversity among the 
parties. 
Because the action has been sent back to 
state court, we can only reverse the district 
court's decision on Ferguson's motion to 
dismiss. As indicated above, the remand 
must remain undisturbed. We express no 
opinion on the merits of the motions filed 
below for either remand or dismissal. Be-
cause the dismissal is now a nullity, Fergu-
son remains a defendant in the action re-
manded to the Illinois state court. See 
Waco, 293 U.S. at 143-44, 55 S.Ct. at 7. 
Ill 
For the reasons stated above, we DENY 
Ferguson's motion to dismiss this appeal 
and REVERSE that portion of the judgment 
of the district court dismissing defendant 
Ferguson for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
zens of the state in which the suit was brought. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b); Kanzelberger v. Kan-
zelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 776-77 (7th Cir.1986). 
When this action was removed, Stride, a citizen 
of Illinios, was listed as a defendant. This would 
be another reason for the district court to consid-
er first the realignment of the parties. 
V ART PRESS, LTD., a Canadian 
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
WESTERN PRINTING MACHINERY 
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 85-2192, 
ited States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Un  
; gued Jan. 23, 1986. 
Decided May 30, 1986. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc 
Denied June 27, 1986. 
Purchaser brought warranty action for 
damages resulting from purchase of paper 
cutting machine built by manufacturer. 
The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Richard A. 
Posner, Circuit Judge, sitting by designa-
tion, entered judgment on a jury verdict in 
favor of purchaser, and manufacturer ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Bauer, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that trial judge, who per-
mitted only rudimentary inquiries estab-
lishing identity of venirepersons and asking 
whether each potential juror believed he 
could be impartial, and did not inquire as to 
level of veniirepersons' education or permit 
inquiry as to their attitudes toward general 
nature or particular facts of the case, un-
duly restricted voir dire. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Jury <s=>131(2) 
Trial judge has broad discretion in lim-
iting voir dire of potential jurors, but that 
discretion is subject to parties' right to an 
impartial jury. 
8. In determining the validity of service prior to 
removal, a federal court must apply the law of 
the state unde^ which the service was made, and 
the question if amenability to suit in diversity 
actions continues to be governed by state law 
even after rerhoval. See 4 C. Wright & A. Mil-
ler, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1082 at 
329-31 (1969) 
ART PRESS v. WESTERN PRINTING MACHINERY 
Cite as 791 V2d 616 (7th Cir. 1986) 
2. Jury <3=>131(4) 
To protect right of parties to an impar-
tial jury, trial court should permit reason-
ably extensive examination of prospective 
jurors so that parties have basis for intelli-
gent exercise of right to challenge, wheth-
er for cause or peremptorily. 
3. Jury <s=>131(2) 
Trial judge's desire not to make voir 
dire a "big deal" in a case which is estimat-
ed to last only a few days is clearly subsidi-
ary to trial judge's duty to impanel an 
impartial jury. 
4. Jury <3=»131(4) 
Trial judge, who permitted only rudi-
mentary inquiries establishing identity of 
venirepersons and asking whether each po-
tential juror believed he could be impartial, 
and did not inquire as to level of venireper-
sons' education or permit inquiry as to 
their attitudes toward general nature or 
particular facts of the case, unduly restrict-
ed voir dire. 
5. Jury <s=>131(3) 
Purpose of voir dire is to elicit informa-
tion which shows biases of venireperson or 
provides counsel with basis for exercising 
peremptory challenges. 
Robert E. Kehoe, Jr., Wildman, Harrold, 
Allen & Dixon, Chicago, 111., for defendant-
appellant. 
Richard J. Gray, Jenner & Block, Chica-
go, for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before BAUER, COFFEY and RIPPLE, 
Circuit Judges. 
BAUER, Circuit Judge. 
A jury awarded plaintiff, Art Press, Ltd., 
$94,709.10 in a warranty action for dam-
ages resulting from plaintiffs purchase of 
a paper cutting machine built by the de-
fendant, Western Printing Machinery Com-
pany. We vacate the jury's verdict and the 
award and remand for a new trial because 
the district court unduly restricted the voir 
dire of the venirepersons. 
We will discuss the facts underlying this 
action only insofar as ^hey are important to 
the trial court's voir 
jurors. At the final 
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dire of the potential 
pre-trial conference, 
plaintiffs attorney requested that the trial 
judge ask each venireperson his occupation 
and level of formal education, and whether 
he had any family or friends in the printing 
or printing equipment business. Defend-
ant's attorney joined in this request and 
further asked the cburt to question the 
potential jurors as to their mechanical apti-
tude, their hobbies and interests, and other 
background information. 
The trial court suggested that the parties 
stipulate to a minimum educational level 
requirement for the jurors, but plaintiffs 
counsel declined. The trial court then 
asked counsel why ne was interested in 
voir dire concerning the level of formal 
education, to which plaintiffs counsel re-
sponded: I 
[I]t helps me when I'm addressing the 
juror if I have some idea of who that 
juror is. It's just a question—and per-
haps [defendant's counsel] will share my 
view here—of my understanding of what 
I need to do as a lawyer to relate to that 
particular juror, and if I have some idea 
of the educational background or the oc-
cupation of that juror, it allows me, I 
think, to do a better job of lawyering. 
Defendant's counsel then added: 
I guess there are a number of things to 
look for in trying to decide what is a 
good juror for this case or any case, 
although you want to tailor it to the 
ability to hear and understand the kinds 
of issues that are presented in this par-
ticular case. Certainly, we want to try 
to ferret out any bias that a witness may 
have, but on top of that, I think we also 
want to try to familiarize ourselves with 
the chemical background of the jurors, 
because each of these jurors is asked to 
bring to bear theiih background, experi-
ence and common judgments, common 
experiences, in deciding these issues, and 
in connection with trying to make a deci-
sion whether or not to exercise a peremp-
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tory challenge, I know myself, and I sus-
pect [plaintiffs counsel], too, would like 
to know as much as we possibly can 
about each of these potential jurors. I 
agree with [plaintiffs counsel] that I 
don't think we can set any qualifications 
for eligibility here. 
The trial judge stated that he had "grave 
doubts" about asking questions concerning 
education because he had once observed a 
case in which 
one of the lawyers used his peremptory 
challenges to get rid of the only jurors 
who seemed by their background to be 
equipped to understand the case. That's 
why if you want to stipulate that you 
were looking for some minimum edu-
cation, that would be fine, but I don't 
want you using—one of you using your 
peremptory challenges to get rid of a 
person who has some business back-
ground or some education and end up 
with a jury of people who don't know 
what's going on. 
The trial judge took the parties' requests 
under advisement, but stated that he did 
not "want to make the voir dire a big deal 
in a case that's only going to last a couple 
of days." 
When the jury venire was assembled, the 
trial judge first determined whether any of 
the venirepersons were not qualified under 
28 U.S.C. 1865, which sets forth citizenship, 
minimum age, and other basic require-
ments for jury service. The trial judge 
then asked the prospective jurors only the 
following questions: 
(1) the venireperson's name, address, 
and prior jury service; 
(2) the venireperson's employer or occu-
pation; 
(3) the venireperson's familiarity with ei-
ther party or their counsel; 
(4) if the venireperson (or immediate 
family or friends) had been employed in the 
printing or machinery business; 
(5) if the venireperson felt he could be 
impartial in the case. 
The trial judge specifically rejected any 
voir dire as to the prospective jurors' edu-
SERIES 
cation, stating that he did not want to 
"drag out in public the deficiencies of their 
education" and that if one of the attorneys 
exercised * a peremptory challenge against 
someone who had a deficient education, it 
might be a little embarrassing." The trial 
judge further stated that the attorneys 
could "infer from their occupation and their 
accent what kind of education [the venire-
persons] have." 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the 
trial judge so limited the voir dire of the 
potential jurors that it was prevented from 
intelligently exercising its peremptory chal-
lenges and pom eliciting information which 
could have led to challenges for cause. 
Plaintiff argues that the voir dire, though 
restricted, was sufficient to obtain an im-
partial jury. 
II. 
[1,2] A 
right to an 
Motor Co., 
To protect 
trial judge has broad discretion 
in limiting the voir dire of potential jurors, 
but this discretion is subject to the parties' 
impartial jury. Fietzer v. Ford 
622 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1980). 
this right, a trial court "should 
permit a reasonably extensive examination 
of prospective jurors so that the parties 
have a basis for an intelligent exercise of 
the right to challenge," Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 
284, whether for cause or peremptorily. 
Id. at 285. \See United States v. Bellinger, 
472 F.2d 340, 368 (7th Cir.1972) (trial court 
must permit "sufficient inquiry into the 
background and attitudes of the jurors to 
enable [the parties] to exercise intelligently 
their peremptory challenges"). This court 
"has been zealous in its protection of prob-
ing voir dJre," Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 284 
(quoting Btard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 
501 (7th Cij.1979)), and will reverse a trial 
court for abuse of its discretion "when 
limitations placed on the parameters of voir 
dire threaten to undermine the purpose for 
conducting an examination of prospective 
jurors." Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 285. 
[5-5] We believe that the voir dire con-
ducted in this case was so limited as to 
United States Court 
N.L.RB. v. AUBURN FOUNDRY, INC. 
Cite M 791 F.2d 619 (7th Or. 1986) 
preclude the parties from adequately dis-
covering whether the jurors were biased or 
prejudiced and did not permit sufficient 
inquiry to allow the parties to intelligently 
exercise their peremptory challenges. We 
first note that it is not necessary, as plain-
tiff seems to assert, to show that a member 
of the jury was in fact prejudiced; it is 
enough to show that the voir dire did not 
reasonably assure that bias or prejudice 
would be discovered, if present. Bellinger, 
472 F.2d at 367. We do not believe that 
the voir dire in this case provided that 
reasonable assurance because it failed to 
go beyond asking the venirepersons only a 
few of what this court in Fietzer termed 
"stock questions:" the rudimentary in-
quiries that establish the identity of the 
venireperson. The trial judge did not even 
inquire as to the level of the potential ju-
rors' education, which Fietzer also stated 
was a "stock question/'l The only inquiry 
permitted beyond the basic questions about 
the venirepersons' identity was whether 
each potential juror believed he could be 
impartial. In United States v. Lewin, 467 
F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.1972), this court 
held that such "a general question is inade-
quate to call to the attention of the venire-
men those important matters that might 
lead them to recognize or display their dis-
qualifying attributes." The trial judge per-
mitted no inquiry designed to elicit the 
venirepersons' attitudes toward the general 
nature or particular facts of the case. See 
Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 286. This severe limi-
tation undermined voir dire's purpose of 
eliciting information that shows the biases 
of a venireperson or provides counsel with 
a basis for exercising peremptory chal-
lenges. See Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 284 (quot-
ing Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 
779 (3rd Cir.1965)); Lemn, 467 F.2d at 
1138. We therefore vacate the jury's ver-
dict and award and remand for a new trial. 
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Administrative law judge determined 
that employer had committed unfair labor 
practice by discriminatbrily discharging 
employees for activities during strike and 
recommended that employees be reinstated 
and awarded back pay. Almost three 
years after National Labor Relations 
Board's first hearing in matter, Board af-
firmed and ordered reinstatement and back 
pay for all aggrieved employees. Petition 
for enforcement was brought The Court 
of Appeals, Flaum, Circuit Judge, held that 
Court of Appeals would not refrain from 
enforcing Board's order mandating rein-
statement, despite employer's claim of new-
ly discovered evidence. 
Order enforced. 
1. Labor Relations <£=>688 
Appellate court has authority to order 
National Labor Relations Board to review 
new facts that impact on whether remedy 
ordered by Board should be enforced. Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e). 
2. Labor Relations <3=>688 
Appellate court cannot declare "mate-
VACATED AND REMANDED 
1. Although this court is sympathetic with trial 
judges who wish to avoid lengthy voir dire, a 
trial judge's desire not "to make the voir dire a 
big deal in a case that's only going to last a 
rial" factual matters which under National 
couple of days" is clearly subsidiary to his duty 
to impanel an impartial jury. Dellinger, Ml 
, F.2d at 370 n. 42. 
